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HealthcareHealthcare organisations are often encouraged to learn from other industries in order to develop proac-
tive and rigorous safety management practices. In the UK safety–critical industries safety cases have been
used to provide justification that systems are acceptably safe. There has been growing interest in health-
care in the application of safety cases for medical devices and health information technology. However,
the introduction of safety cases into general safety management and regulatory practices in healthcare is
largely unexplored and unsupported. Should healthcare as an industry be encouraged to adopt safety
cases more widely? This paper reviews safety case practices in six UK industries and identifies drivers
and developments in the adoption of safety cases. The paper argues that safety cases might best be used
in healthcare to provide an exposition of risk rather than as a regulatory tool to demonstrate acceptable
levels of safety. Safety cases might support healthcare organisations in establishing proactive safety
management practices. However, there has been criticism that safety cases practices have, at times,
contributed to poor safety management and standards by prompting a ‘‘tick-box” and compliance-
driven approach. These criticisms represent challenges for the adoption of safety cases in healthcare,
where the level of maturity of safety management systems is arguably still lower than in traditional
safety–critical industries. Healthcare stakeholders require access to education and guidance that takes
into account the specifics of healthcare as an industry. Further research is required to provide evidence
about the effectiveness of safety cases and the costs involved with the approach.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Patient safety is an area of significant public concern. In the UK,
there has been much media coverage of the findings of the Public
Inquiry into the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.
The report suggests that between 2005 and 2009 as many as 1200
patients died needlessly as a result of inadequate and often appal-
ling standards of care (Francis, 2013). There is evidence from a
wide range of countries and health systems that suggests that
patients around the world are suffering preventable adverse events
(Vincent et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2004; de Vries
et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2000; Brennan et al., 1991). Adverse
events cause unnecessary suffering, and they also have significant
financial implications resulting from additional bed days andextended care requirements of patients, as well as from increased
insurance and litigation costs (Vincent et al., 2001; Ovretveit,
2009).
Healthcare organisations have been encouraged to consider les-
sons from safety management in safety–critical industries in order
to improve the safety of patients and reduce the number of adverse
events (Department of Health, 2000; Kohn et al., 2000). For exam-
ple, in the English National Health Service (NHS) lessons learned
about incident reporting in aviation have contributed to the estab-
lishment of a national incident reporting system (National Report-
ing and Learning System) (Carruthers and Phillip, 2006). There is
also an increasing number of documented examples of the applica-
tion of risk analysis methods such as Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA), which healthcare organisations are becoming
more familiar with (Apkon et al., 2004; Burgmeier, 2002;
Steinberger et al., 2009; Sujan and Felici, 2012).
In UK safety–critical industries, manufacturers and operators of
safety–critical systems, such as nuclear power plants and
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tive regulatory authority (Maguire, 2006). In these industries
safety cases provide an accepted means for demonstrating and
assessing that a disciplined and effective approach to managing
risk has been adopted, and that the resulting system can be
regarded with confidence as acceptably safe (Bloomfield et al.,
2012a). However, there has also been criticism of the safety case
approach suggesting that poor safety case practices were a key
contributor to accidents by prompting a ‘‘tick-box” and overly
compliance-driven approach to safety (Haddon-Cave, 2009). Stud-
ies also suggest that there was a lack of evidence about their effec-
tiveness as a tool for regulatory oversight (Leveson, 2011; Steinzor,
2011).
In healthcare there has been recent interest in the safety case
concept, in particular for medical devices (Sujan et al., 2007) such
as infusion pumps (FDA, 2014), and for health information technol-
ogy (Health and Care Information Centre, 2013a, 2013b; Sujan
et al., 2013). However, there is little established evidence about
the role of safety cases for improving safety management practices
in healthcare more widely (Sujan et al., 2015). There is also rela-
tively little guidance on safety case use that is based on lessons
across different industries rather than being very industry-
specific. This lack of evidence and guidance is particularly prob-
lematic since safety management practices and the regulatory con-
text in healthcare differ significantly from other safety–critical
industries. Safety management in healthcare is arguably still lar-
gely driven by a reactive mindset and a regulatory approach that
relies on routinely collected outcome data (such as mortality
rates). There is a threat that within such a culture and environment
safety cases might be perceived as another document-producing
regulatory tool, or as a replacement to actual proactive thinking
about patient safety risks.
Are safety cases a potential threat to mindful safety manage-
ment or simply a necessary evil, or do safety cases have the poten-
tial to make a positive contribution to the development of more
systematic and rigorous safety management practices in health-
care under the right circumstances? This paper presents lessons
from a study (Bloomfield et al., 2012a) that reviewed the applica-
tion of safety cases in six safety–critical industries (automotive,
civil aviation, defence, nuclear, petrochemical and railways). The
paper analyses drivers and developments in the adoption of safety
cases across these industries. Based on such a broad, cross-industry
review of safety case practices, the paper then examines critically
challenges, lessons and prerequisites for the potential widespread
and systematic development of safety cases within healthcare.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises
the conceptual background to safety cases. Section 3 reflects on a
review of safety case practices in six different industries, and iden-
tifies lessons across these industries for the adoption of safety
cases. Section 4 briefly reviews the emerging use of safety cases
in healthcare. Section 5 discusses the findings of the cross-
industry analysis and identifies opportunities and challenges for
the adoption of safety cases in healthcare. Section 6 concludes with
the main implications for practice and for research.
2. Safety cases
Many of the current regulatory approaches in the UK require
that manufacturers and operators of safety–critical systems
demonstrate that they have adopted a thorough and systematic
process for understanding proactively the risks associated with
their systems and to control these risks appropriately. With these
approaches the regulator formulates goals, but the demonstration
that the goals have been achieved is left to the manufacturers
and operators of systems. This provides them with the flexibility
to argue their case taking into account the specific context andany technological advances. In the UK, these duties are often ful-
filled through the use of safety cases. This current regulatory
approach is the result of a shift from compliance-based to more
goal-based regulatory approaches over the past 20 years. Under a
predominantly prescriptive regulatory regime, manufacturers and
operators claim safety through the satisfaction of specific stan-
dards and technical requirements specified by the regulator, rather
than by demonstrating that certain higher-level goals have been
met. The compliance-based approach has been criticised for
prompting bureaucratic practices of safety management, where
risks may not be properly understood, and for potentially hinder-
ing progress in industries that are driven by technological innova-
tions (Hawkins et al., 2013; Habli and Kelly, 2006; Bishop et al.,
2004). The goal-based approach aims to overcome these shortcom-
ings of prescriptive regulatory regimes by providing both more
responsibility as well as more flexibility to operators of systems.
The purpose of a safety case can be described as providing a
structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that pro-
vides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system
is acceptably safe for a given application in a given context (UK
Ministry of Defence, 2007). A key characteristic of the safety case
is a risk-based argument and corresponding evidence. This is
intended to demonstrate that all risks associated with a particular
system have been identified, that appropriate risk controls have
been put in place, and that there are appropriate processes in place
to monitor the effectiveness of the risk controls and the safety per-
formance of the system on an on-going basis. The argument and
evidence in safety cases are then examined and challenged, typi-
cally by independent safety assessors, as part of the overall safety
assessment or certification process. Safety cases are usually confi-
dential, but there are publicly available safety cases (see for exam-
ple the Safety Case Repository (Dependability Research Group
University of Virginia). The literature also includes descriptions
of real safety case developments, as well as suggestions for high-
level arguments and argument strategies (for example Barker
et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2014; Chinneck et al., 2004; Habli et al.,
2010). The use of safety cases is an accepted best practice in UK
safety–critical industries, and is adopted by companies as a means
of providing rigour and structure to their safety management sys-
tems. This is in line with recommendations provided by Lord Cul-
len in the highly influential Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha oil
platform explosion (The Honourable Lord Cullen, 1990). The report
emphasises that meeting regulatory requirements should only be a
secondary function of the safety case. The safety case should, first
and foremost, provide assurance to the operators of safety–critical
systems themselves that they have followed a systematic and thor-
ough approach to ensure that their systems are safe (The
Honourable Lord Cullen, 1990).
However, safety cases are not a panacea for successful safety
management, and there has been criticism of the approach. It is
important to critically review the lessons, criticisms and challenges
of safety case practice in order tomake suggestions for themeaning-
ful adoption of safety cases in other industries, such as healthcare.
3. Review of safety case practices in six safety–critical industries
3.1. Aims, methodology and limitations
The recent interest in safety cases from industries like health-
care, which have little practical experience with the concept, justi-
fies a longitudinal study into existing ‘‘good practices” as well as
potential concerns. A review of safety case practices across differ-
ent industries was undertaken (Bloomfield et al., 2012a, 2012b).
The aim of the review was to document the different regulatory
contexts, the key developments and drivers, and the types of safety
cases and their content for each industry in order to provide an
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and their potential application in novel domains such as
healthcare.
The review considered six safety–critical industries: automo-
tive, civil aviation, defence, nuclear, petrochemical and railways.
These were chosen to constitute a set of representative traditional
safety–critical industries as well as an industry that has recently
begun to show an interest in the adoption of safety cases (automo-
tive). A review template to be used for all industries was developed
and agreed during project meetings. The review template sug-
gested description of the following broad topics for each industry:
regulatory context and best practice, developments and drivers,
types of safety cases and content, and key lessons. Rapid, narrative
literature reviews were conducted for each industry by experts in
the respective industry during January–March 2011. As opposed to
systematic reviews, there is not necessarily an agreed definition of
what constitutes a rapid review. The purpose of the reviews in this
project was to provide within a reasonable period of time an evi-
dence summary of safety case use across the different industries.
The scope of the reviews was limited to domains, standards and
guidelines in which safety cases have played an important role in
the safety certification or assessment processes. Such an approach
bears the risk of missing some information, and of introducing bias
during the critical appraisal. In order to reduce these risks, each
industry review was internally cross-reviewed by two other
experts. A stakeholder workshop was conducted in March 2011
to validate and consolidate the findings. The workshop brought
together participants from industry and from healthcare. The pro-
gramme and the presentations of the workshop are available for
download (Workshop on Safety Cases – Lessons from Industry
and Application in Healthcare, 2011).
3.2. Cross-industry analysis
The detailed industry reviews are publicly available for down-
load (Bloomfield et al., 2012b), and are not repeated here. Table 1
summarises for each industry the key lessons and challenges for
safety case use that were identified from the individual industry
reviews. In this sub-section these findings from each individual
industry are analysed in order to identify common themes across
the industries: the role of the regulator, drivers behind the
adoption of safety cases, the demonstration of acceptable levels
of risk, the practicality of review of safety cases, and the problem
of providing empirical evidence of the effectiveness of safety cases.
3.2.1. Role of the regulator
Independent national regulatory bodies typically provide tech-
nical requirements, guidance and advice to manufacturers and
operators of systems, but they also possess the powers to issue
warnings and withhold or withdraw permission to operate a
system.
The role of the regulator and the approach taken was a key
influence in the adoption of safety cases. The inclusion of safety
cases in the regulatory framework set a mandate for the industry.
For example, the HSE requires the development of safety cases (or
safety reports) from high-risk offshore and on-shore petrochemical
installations as outlined in the Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations 2005 (The Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations, 2005) and the Control of Major Accident Hazards Reg-
ulation 1999 (COMAH) HSE, 1999. In the UK defence sector, the
development and acceptance of safety cases as a means of assuring
and certifying the acceptable safety of UK defence-related equip-
ment has become widespread since the mid-1990s. There was a
notable change in 1996 from Issue 1 to Issue 2 of Defence Standard
00-56 (Safety Management Requirements for Defence Related
Systems, current Issue 4 2007) (UK Ministry of Defence, 2007) toinclude the concept of safety cases as an essential part of the pro-
curement of UK defence related system. In the time since Issue 2 of
Def Stan 00-56, the Ministry of Defence’s own internal safety man-
agement standards (documented through Joint Service Publica-
tions – JSPs) have all gradually been updated to include the
requirements for the development and acceptance of safety cases.
Examples include JSP 430 (UK Ministry of Defence, 1996) requiring
safety cases for ships and ship systems, JSP 553 (UK Ministry of
Defence, 2003) requiring safety cases for military aircraft, and JSP
454 (UK Ministry of Defence, 2002) requiring safety cases for land
systems. The existence of clear regulatory standards and clear def-
initions facilitates a practice of producing explicit and structured
safety arguments.
However, the shift from prescriptive towards a goal-based reg-
ulatory paradigm has caused confusion, at times, within the indus-
tries, and detailed guidance and input by the regulator was
required. The HSE, for example, acknowledged that there were
new challenges under the COMAH legislation, in particular around
the concept of ‘‘reasonably practicable” to determine whether risks
had been adequately controlled (HSE) (see discussion on accept-
able levels of risk below). The lack of experience and expertise with
the safety case approach presents a further threat to its successful
adoption. This relates not only to manufacturers and operators of
systems, but also to the regulator. Regulatory bodies as well as
industry stakeholders require education and training in order to
implement and assess safety cases meaningfully. The lack of expe-
rience can also lead to the development of safety cases that are
overly complex, that lack focus, and that are developed predomi-
nantly for the purpose of regulatory compliance.
In those instances where these challenges are overcome, safety
cases have the potential to support the industries in managing
safety in complex and dynamic environments across organisational
boundaries. Industry best practice integrates the safety case as a
key element in the communication between regulators and system
operators, and in the safety management systems of the organisa-
tions. Safety cases are developed for both equipment and service
levels to ensure an integrated system-wide view. They are required
to be continuously updated and maintained as living and accurate
documentation of the risks and the approach to dealing with them.3.2.2. Drivers: accidents and increasing economic, organisational and
technological change
The history of safety cases and safety case legislation in high-
risk industries in the UK has been closely linked to the occurrence
of high profile accidents. However, each industry was also subject
to significant economic, organisational and technological changes
within the industry that were then reflected in the approach taken
to ensure continuing safety of the systems operated. The safety
case approach was adopted in the different industries to provide
a flexible yet clear regulatory framework able to ensure continuing
safety in complex, fragmented and technologically driven systems.
In the petrochemical industry, the 1976 Seveso accident at a
small chemical manufacturing facility in Italy resulted in the devel-
opment of legislation aimed at the prevention and control of major
accidents. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha oil platform
explosion (1988) The Honourable Lord Cullen, 1990 resulted in
the adoption of a formal safety case requirement in the UK offshore
industry. These accidents have been covered widely in the media,
and their impact was industry-wide. This, in turn, prompted a
wider discussion about the risks society is willing to tolerate in
exchange for the benefits that such endeavours bring. In the UK,
for example, the HSE published its criteria for decisions related
to the regulation of risk in the context of changes in the prefer-
ences, values and expectations of society (HSE; Health and Safety
Executive, 2001).
Table 1
Summary of key lessons and challenges for safety case practice identified from individual industry and healthcare reviews.
Industry Key lessons and challenges for safety case practice identified
Automotive Increased focus through standardisation: although the concept of a safety case was considered in earlier automotive safety guidelines (MISRA, 2007), the
international standard ISO 26262 has significantly increased interest within the automotive safety industry in how safety arguments and evidence
should be generated, documented, reviewed and maintained for automotive systems
Process focus and lack of industry experience with safety cases: experience to date suggests that the primary focus of many of the documented safety cases
for ISO 26262-compliant systems and components remains on processes (Birch et al., 2013). In extreme cases, this can result in bulky documentation
that does little more than comply with the letter of the standard. Other characteristics have reduced the effectiveness of certain ISO 26262-compliant
safety cases including: lack of focus and brevity; unnecessary repetition of information available elsewhere; and the use of inappropriate means of
expression
Lack of published evidence: currently, there is neither published evidence nor consensus within the industry on the real value of an automotive safety
case, particularly when a safety process is compliant with ISO 26262. On the one hand, some stakeholders in the industry are treating the safety case as
a repository of the work products generated from the safety lifecycle phases. One the other hand, other stakeholders are emphasising the role of the
argument in showing how and why the work products (i.e. evidence) support the overarching claim that residual risks are acceptable and the
importance of the timely generation of well-focussed safety arguments that are capable of improving both the development and assessment of
automotive E/E systems
Civil aviation Fragmentation across the industry: there is a need for integration between compliance-based and performance-based certification in order to reduce the
gap between the assessment of airborne and ground-based systems.
Trade off between clarity and brevity: given the complex technical contents of typical aviation safety cases, it is difficult to achieve the right balance
between clarity and brevity. Most safety cases require a good understanding of system design and operational aspects. This understanding is hard to
fully provide through the safety case report on its own
Resources required for adequate regulatory oversight: regulatory bodies may find it difficult to provide sufficient numbers of human resources and with
the appropriate domain knowledge to complete the review of safety cases. This may threaten their ability to execute their regulatory oversight
function
Integration of safety cases into safety management activities: EUROCONTROL states that the safety case should ‘‘provide an adequate means of obtaining
regulatory approval for the service or project concerned” (Eurocontrol, 2006). However, a safety case does not constitute the only communication and
coordination means between the service provider and the regulator. Other coordination processes are needed to ensure a continuous discussion of
safety relevant issues. These processes are often poorly integrated with the safety case. This may result in the safety case being developed for mere
compliance
Defence Substantial body of experience: there is a substantial body of experience with safety case development within the UK defence domain. The domain has
now lived with the cross-service requirement for safety cases for over fifteen years. As the Nimrod Review Report discusses, in this period there have
been examples of poor safety cases alongside positive examples (Haddon-Cave, 2009). There is therefore much to learn from safety case practice in the
UK defence domain
Clarity of approach: positive features to observe include clear regulatory standards (such as Defence Standard 00-56), clear definitions, and the practice
of producing explicit and structured safety arguments
Risk of complacency: negative experiences to note include where safety case development appears to have become a ‘paper exercise’ through lack of
stakeholder engagement, where the focus of safety management has been on maintaining safety case argumentation rather than maintaining the
safety of the system, and where safety cases have not been used or allowed to influence and change practice
Lack of organisational support: Further barriers to effective safety case use are practices where there has been insufficient organisational support for the
MoD’s many roles with respect to safety cases (customer, operator, regulator, owner)
Hierarchy of safety cases: the Defence domain has evolved a clear understanding of the difference between equipment safety cases, and wider
operational safety cases, and that a hierarchy of safety cases are sometimes required in order to establish an overall safety case
Nuclear Substantial body of experience: the nuclear industry was the first industry in the UK to adopt the safety case approach with the Nuclear Installations Act
1965. Safety cases reflect accepted best practice, and a shared view of how safety of nuclear installations should be justified
Clarity of approach: the Office for Nuclear Regulation has produced detailed Safety Assessment Principles (SAP) that set out what kind of information
should be contained in nuclear safety cases. These SAPs are complemented by Technical Assessment Guides (TAG), which provide guidance on the
interpretation and application of the SAPs (Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2014a, 2014b)
Slower rate of change: drivers for the adoption of safety cases and structured safety management approaches in the nuclear industry include
technological developments, changes to the energy market, and a number of accidents and incidents. However, the overall rate of change in the
industry is slow compared to other industries
Qualities of and problems with safety cases: safety cases should be intelligible, valid, complete, evidential, robust, integrated, balanced and forward
looking. The ONR has identified common short-comings with respect to all of these qualities, and has updated the guidance on ‘The purpose, scope and
content of safety cases’ (NS-TAST-GD-051 Revision 3) (Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2013)
Petrochemical Lack of published evidence: there is little published evidence that safety cases have made an improvement to safety performance in the petrochemical
industry (HSE, 2006a). However, their application, in much the same way as for accident investigation, has high face validity. Certainly, it would be
difficult to argue that reviewing hazards and assessing risks could have anything other than a positive impact on safety performance
Resource implications: safety report development is a potentially onerous activity for the establishments concerned. This is particularly the case in a
goal-setting environment where the onus is on the operators to demonstrate that they are managing risk. There may be a danger, for example, of an
organisation employing an external consultancy to develop a standard report that does little to engage the operator in the review of safety risks at their
facility
Low probability, high consequence events: A continuing challenge is dealing with the low probability nature of the major accidents that the safety report
seeks to address. The industry is currently engaged in an effort to identify safety indicators that may more accurately indicate sites that are vulnerable
to major accidents (HSE, 2006b)
Safety case maintenance: ideally, safety reports would be living documents; continuously maintained as a risk register and a demonstration that the site
is managing safety. However, the requirement for demonstration in relation to the ALARP concept means that reports often run to several hundred
pages. They are typically complex documents that take up considerable site time and effort to develop. It may be challenging to sustain such a level of
effort without regulatory pressure. Questions may also be asked whether in certain situations the focus on safety report development may detract from
the day-to-day running of the plant
Railway Safety management in a fragmented, mixed economy: the introduction of the safety case regime onto the UK’s railways was driven by and concurrent
with privatisation. There has been much debate about whether the fragmentation and consequent communication difficulties due to privatisation
were contributory causes of the Southall and Ladbroke Grove disasters, and whether rail safety has improved or not since privatisation. One study
suggested that a steady improvement in rail safety, as evidenced by a continuing decline in significant train accidents per unit distance travelled, had
continued through the period of privatisation (Evans, 2007). It is likely that the safety case regime and its emphasis on safety management and risk
control had in fact contributed to maintaining this trend, despite the negative impact of the fragmentation of British Rail assumed or argued for by
many critics, particularly in technical journalism
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Table 1 (continued)
Industry Key lessons and challenges for safety case practice identified
Lack of published evidence: there is little published evidence to support the proposition that safety cases have made a significant improvement to safety
performance on Britain’s railways. It may be very difficult to isolate the safety case regime from other potentially relevant factors in the face of the
second order change facing the railway industry after 1994. However, there are views inside the industry suggesting that the application of the
constituent parts of a safety case regime appeared to add value. It is possible that the UK’s railway safety case regime assisted in maintaining safety
through the serious upheavals associated with privatisation or part privatisation
Communication and collaboration among stakeholders: one of the strengths of the UK Rail safety case regime was the system of assuring that the
Infrastructure Controller reviewed and approved the safety cases of its operators. Critics of the system might say that this was merely ensuring an
element of cohesion that would not have had to be enforced if the industry had not been fragmented by privatising it in the way that this was done.
However, the complexity of modern industrial systems is such that collaboration between different organisations cannot be avoided in the delivery of
any substantial service and systems for communication and sharing of data become essential. The safety case regime may have contributed to ensuring
that resource was committed to the necessary level of co-operation at all levels
Healthcare Learning from practices within safety–critical industries: the use of safety cases in healthcare is a recent phenomenon (Ray and Cleaveland, 2013;
Despotou et al., 2012). Far from being an accepted best practice, the safety case approach is being trialled for small subsets of the healthcare system,
which tend to be close to the traditional engineering tradition. In these areas, learning from best practices in other industries and review of their
respective standards and approaches to safety management, have driven the current developments
Low maturity of safety management practices: it could be argued that safety management practices in healthcare at present are less mature than those in
other safety–critical industries. The introduction of goal-based approaches to regulation including the development of safety cases may have the
potential to contribute to a more structured and rigorous approach to safety management in this industry
Education and training: a significant threat to the successful uptake of the safety case approach is the lack of experience with the concept and the lack of
expertise both within the regulatory bodies as well as among the stakeholders within the domain. Education and training for regulators,
manufacturers, and service providers, as well as research evidence about the efficacy of the approach will be essential prerequisites for spreading the
approach to the wider healthcare sector
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important role in shaping the management and oversight of safety.
For example, the 1987 fire on an escalator at King’s Cross on the
London Underground and the 1988 Clapham main line derailment
led to Public Enquiry reports (Fennell, 1998; Hidden, 1989) that
implemented fundamental changes in the assessment of risk and
management of safety on urban and main line railways. A further
important driver for the adoption of safety cases in the UK railway
industry was the introduction of privatisation to the surface rail-
ways in the UK and part-privatisation on the London Underground,
which led to a period of commercial instability and insolvency in
both cases. The Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 1994 (The
Railways (Safety Case) Regulations, 1994) were adopted in order
to meet the safety management challenges in a fragmented and
mixed economy.
In the nuclear industry, the Windscale fire in 1957 led to the
Nuclear Installations Act 1959 (with revision in 1965) that intro-
duced a licensing scheme along with the requirement for the pro-
duction of a safety case. A further driver for the adoption of safety
cases were technical problems and high costs associated with the
construction of advanced gas-cooled reactors, which prompted
the UK Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) to consider
the adoption of the American Pressurised Water Reactor (APW)
design. Subsequently, a Public Inquiry was set up in 1983 to review
the acceptability of the APW design (Layfield, 1987). This inquiry
was based largely on the Pre-Construction Safety Case, and took
almost two years to complete. The licensing process for the con-
firmed new power plants in the UK will take a similar approach
with the safety case being a core element.
3.2.3. Demonstration of acceptable levels of risk
The UK safety–critical industries included in the review have all
adopted the concept of ‘‘reasonable practicability” to demonstrate
that hazards have been controlled effectively. This is based on the
Health & Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 (Health and Safety at Work
etc, 1974) and the guidance developed by the HSE on ‘‘Reducing
Risk: Protecting People” (Health and Safety Executive, 2001). The
concept of reasonable practicability dates back to a legal case in
1949, in which the UK National Coal Board was defending a case
in court following the death of an employee. In effect, this case
established that operators of systems have a legal duty to reduce
risk unless the sacrifices (in terms of money, effort, etc.) are grosslydisproportionate to the expected benefits. This principle is known
as So far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP) or As Low As Reason-
ably Practicable (ALARP) in its practical application. It requires from
the operator a conscious and transparent decision about whether
or not risk control measures are put in place. In current practice,
the risk space is divided into three different regions: the region
of unacceptable risk, where societal concerns are so great that
the system cannot be operated; the region of negligible risk, where
the risk is perceived to be so small that no further action is
required to mitigate the risk; and the region of tolerable risk – this
is the region where the risk is perceived to be tolerable, but only if
further risk reduction is impracticable or if the associated costs are
grossly disproportionate.
The HSE emphasises the importance of openness and trans-
parency about how decisions are taken on the regulation of risk
(Health and Safety Executive, 2001). A shared framework and clear
guidance would enhance consistency and contribute to the spread
of best practice. However, the evaluation of whether risk has been
reduced as low as reasonably practicable can be complex in prac-
tice. The HSE recommends following industry-wide good practice,
followed by the application of quantitative cost-benefit analyses
(CBA) in cases where costs are claimed to be grossly disproportion-
ate. However, the application of quantitative methods should be
regarded only as supplementary information intended to inform
decisions, but CBA cannot replace the qualitative assessment of
risk and mitigation by experts (HSE).
While the concept of ALARP is widely accepted in the UK, its
application has not been without problems and controversy. For
example, the Nimrod review (Haddon-Cave, 2009) extensively dis-
sects the ALARP judgements made concerning risks by the Nimrod
Integrated Project Team, suppliers, and independent advisors, and
questions whether the principle of ALARP was fully understood. In
addition, both within the UK as well as in other countries there
exists an argument questioning the ethics of ALARP. Such an
opposing position calls for the implementation of safety measures
capable of eliminating risk regardless of cost. If this is not the case
then it is implied that a preventable accident is acceptable to
organisations, the regulators and the government. For example,
there had been much criticism of the decision not to adopt network
wide Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems in the UK railways,
following a CBA undertaken by British Rail that suggested that the
costs of ATP far outweighed its benefits. This ethical argument is
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no immediate involvement, such as the population in the proxim-
ity of a site where toxic materials were released.3.2.4. Practicality of review
The acceptance criteria for safety cases (i.e. the acceptable
means of demonstrating safety rather than the acceptable level
of safety) are poorly defined in many of the sectors reviewed in
the study (e.g. automotive), and they also vary significantly
between domains. The lack of clearly defined and understood
acceptance criteria (e.g. to help assess whether a safety case is
‘‘compelling” as required by UK Ministry of Defence (2007) can
challenge already stretched and understaffed regulatory authori-
ties, which will also struggle to build assessment expertise due
to differences between the acceptance criteria, safety arguments
and items of evidence submitted for each safety case (Leveson,
2011). The lack of adequate funding of the regulatory authority is
a key concern and threat to the successful adoption of the safety
case approach. Steinzor even argues that the US petrochemical
industry should not adopt the UK safety case regime because the
American regulator was not adequately resourced (Steinzor, 2011).
The freedom offered within a goal-based safety case regime
necessitates strong review (including regulatory review). Histori-
cally, there has been more emphasis on the development than
the review of safety case arguments and evidence. For example,
for safety case development, there is a well-documented body of
work on safety argument patterns and templates that support
the reuse of common styles of reasoning. Similarly, there are estab-
lished approaches to the representation of safety arguments (e.g.
Goal Structuring Notation GSN and Claims-Arguments-Evidence
CAE). However, increasingly more approaches are being proposed
for the review of safety cases. This is taking the form of qualitative
review (Ayoub et al., 2012), formal mathematical analysis (Rushby,
2010) and quantitative analysis (Rae et al., 2014; Denney et al.,
2011), including approaches that help reviewers in identifying
argument fallacies (Greenwel, 2006), sources of uncertainty and
counter evidence (Hawkins et al., 2011). Without clearly identified
techniques and principles for safety case review (such as the Safety
Assessment Principles defined in the UK Nuclear domain (Office for
Nuclear Regulation, 2014a) there might be justified concerns about
the confidence that can be placed in the safety case and safety case
review.3.2.5. Evidence of effectiveness
The review recorded that safety cases have not been adopted
based on empirical evidence of effectiveness in industry. Instead,
they have been adopted based upon the face validity that explicitly
communicating the safety reasoning and evidence for a system is
better than keeping this reasoning implicit. Apart from mostly aca-
demic case studies and industrial papers reporting anecdotal evi-
dence, there is no empirical evidence that regulation based upon
a safety case approach is more effective than regulation that does
not require the explicit production of safety cases (Leveson,
2011; Wassyng et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2012). In fact, the airborne
side of civil aviation, known for its rigorous and transparent safety
practices and extremely low rates of accidents, does not require
safety cases to be produced as part of its certification regime. The
same can be said about certain defence systems in the US
(Leveson, 2011). A review on the effectiveness of the COMAH reg-
ulations (that require safety cases) concluded that there was no
direct evidence that the introduction of the regulations had
resulted in a reduction in accident risks (HSE, 2006a). Serious crit-
icisms were also raised by the Haddon-Cave review into the Nim-
rod accident concerning safety case practices, regarding both the
construction and assessment of safety cases (Haddon-Cave, 2009).On the other hand, a study that reviewed safety case practices
in the oil and gas sector in New Zealand and Australia suggested
that despite the shortcomings in implementation, the safety case
approach was still accepted as the most effective way to managing
safety in the sector (Fitzgerald et al., 2010). Further empirical evi-
dence, in the form of controlled experiments, case studies or obser-
vational studies, is needed to validate specific claims of successful
or cost-effective use of safety cases in industry, while noting the
wider foundational issue concerning the need for appropriate eval-
uation approaches for empirically validating the use of safety anal-
ysis and assurance techniques in industry.4. Safety case use in healthcare
Healthcare is a broad and complex industry including stake-
holders and products as diverse as drugs and medicines, medical
devices, health information technologies, and services provided
by actors across organisational boundaries. It is often a fragmented
and mixed economy made up of both private and public service
providers. At present there is little experience with the safety case
approach in healthcare (Sujan et al., 2015).4.1. Role of the regulator
In the UK a number of different authorities are providing regu-
latory oversight, and they are following their own standards and
regulatory principles. The only regulatory authority in the UK
healthcare domain that requires the submission of safety cases is
the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). HSCIC
requires manufacturers and operators of health informatics prod-
ucts in the NHS to develop and submit a Clinical Safety Case. The
clinical safety case is based on the safety case principles described
in the defence sector standard Def Stan 00-56.4.2. Drivers: medical device and health information technology failures
In the UK, learning from other industries, in particular from the
defence sector, has prompted interest in the safety case approach.
This has given rise to guidance issued by NHS Connecting for
Health (now part of HSCIC) on Clinical Safety Cases for health infor-
matics products (Health and Care Information Centre, 2013a,
2013b). This was on the back of a report commissioned by the Dep-
uty Chief Medical Officer, which looked at the approach to patient
safety within the National Programme for IT (NPfIT). The report
was prepared on behalf of and published by the National Patient
Safety Agency in 2004 (National Patient Safety Agency, 2004).
The report suggested that safety had not been identified as a driver
for the programme and that there were neither formal risk assess-
ment nor formal clinical safety management systems in place. The
report concluded that NPfIT did not address safety in a structured
and proactive way as other safety–critical industries would do.
Learning from industrial safety standards, in particular IEC 61508
(IEC, 2010a) and Def-Stan-0056 (UK Ministry of Defence, 2007),
and the engagement in standardisation activities, such as IEC
80001 on risk management for IT networks incorporating medical
devices (IEC, 2010b), led to the implementation of a Clinical Safety
Management System Approach, and the publication of two stan-
dards on risk management for the manufacture, deployment and
use of health software aimed at both manufacturers and users
(Health and Care Information Centre, 2013a, 2013b).
Another significant development has taken place in the USA,
where the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidance
for infusion pumps (FDA, 2014), which includes an assurance case
approach that is built on the traditional safety case principle. With
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hensive approach to preventing safety problems.
The FDA states that between 2005 and 2009 they had received
over 56,000 reports of adverse events associated with the use of
infusion pumps (FDA, 2014). These safety problems were the key
driver behind the Infusion Pump Improvement initiative and the
inclusion of the assurance case concept in the guidance. As the
FDA does not have any experience with this concept, it has been
limited to one type of medical device that is perceived to be partic-
ularly high risk.
4.3. Demonstration of acceptable levels of risk
In the NHS, and more generally in healthcare, the notion of
acceptable levels of risk is not well established. Safety manage-
ment is largely driven by analysis of outcome measures in a reac-
tive fashion. Where risks are identified in a proactive fashion,
improvement teams are left to their own devices as to which risks
they should address, and the extent to which risks should be
reduced. As a result, practice is extremely variable across the
health system, and it is lacking in consistency and transparency.
While healthcare providers need to maintain a risk register they
do not normally need to demonstrate that risks have been reduced
to acceptable levels.
There has been recent research on the development of safety
cases for more general healthcare processes, such as handover
from the day care team to the night care team in hospitals (Sujan
et al., 2015). The aim of the research was to support healthcare
organisations in thinking proactively about risks in their processes,
and to facilitate their decision-making processes around potential
risk reduction interventions. However, the research stopped short
of specifying acceptable levels of risk, and the safety case was used
as an improvement and communication tool rather than for regu-
latory purposes.
4.4. Practicality of review
There are few examples of safety cases in the healthcare domain
publicly available. It is, therefore, difficult to determine how organ-
isations and regulators are coping with the development and
review of safety cases. The FDA requires submission of assurance
cases only for one specific type of medical device, because they
do not yet possess the required skills and experience to introduce
the requirement for safety cases at scale. The HSCIC recruited a
number of safety engineers with background from other industries
to help set up the requirement for the submission of Clinical Safety
Cases, and to provide education and training to manufacturers and
healthcare providers.
4.5. Evidence of effectiveness
Since safety cases have not been used much in healthcare there
is no evidence about their effectiveness available. The FDA has not
published any updates about infusion pump incident rates follow-
ing the introduction of the requirement for the submission of an
assurance case. Similarly, no information is available from HSCIC
about the effectiveness of Clinical Safety Cases in reducing the risk
associated with the use of health informatics products.5. Discussion
The review of safety case practices across UK industries suggests
that safety cases are an accepted means of demonstrating that sys-
tems are meeting regulatory expectations and that they can be
regarded as acceptably safe with reasonable confidence. The reviewidentified five themes around the role of the regulator, the drivers
behind the adoption of safety cases, the problem of determining
acceptable levels of risk, the difficulties of regulatory review of
complex technical safety case reports, and the lack of empirical evi-
dence about the effectiveness of safety cases for improving safety
performance. In healthcare, the interest in goal-based regulation
and safety cases has been much more recent, and there is little
established experience with the approach (Sujan et al., 2015).
Regulatory bodies play a key role by setting a mandate for
industry on the one hand, and by providing guidance and advice
on the other hand. However, the industry reviews also suggest that
the introduction of goal-based regulation and the requirements for
safety cases sometimes caused confusion due to lack of experience
and expertise (HSE). In the National Health Service (NHS) in Eng-
land there are a number of different regulatory bodies active, all
with different and sometimes overlapping areas of oversight,
and, crucially, different regulatory approaches. While, for example,
some bodies require adherence to certain risk management stan-
dards, others rely largely on on-site inspection and retrospective
quality and safety data pertaining to serious untoward events
(NHS, 2015) and a set of common forms of patient harms (Power
et al., 2012). Regulatory bodies might need to engage in a discus-
sion and joint effort in order to transition from largely prescriptive
and reactive regulatory approaches towards a more goal-based and
proactive approach. For this to work in practice, there is a need for
inspectors and guidance developers to have a thorough under-
standing of proactive risk management approaches. This might
require targeted education that enables, for example, inspectors
to ask the right questions, and assessors to look for adequate argu-
ments and corresponding evidence. In addition, a suitable commu-
nication tool to facilitate the interaction between regulators and
healthcare organisations around risk is required. Safety cases
might be a potential candidate to facilitate this.
At the core of UK safety case practices is the ALARP principle
that provides a shared framework for justification of safety. While
arguably sometimes difficult to apply in practice (Haddon-Cave,
2009), this approach has none the less brought consistency and
transparency to the different industries. In healthcare no compara-
ble common notion of acceptable levels of risk and reasonable
practicability exists. At present, healthcare organisations do not
possess systematic processes or criteria that enable them to deter-
mine in a consistent and transparent way whether risks should be
reduced further and how the trade-off between cost and risk
reduction should be managed. As a result, the way risks are
approached varies significantly and relies often on individual
judgement (Sujan et al., 2015). The NHS and other healthcare sys-
tems face challenges that are different from the established safety–
critical industries, and there is a duty to provide care to an aging
population with increasingly complex health needs while at the
same time reducing the burden on the taxpayer. It might be argued
that a strict principle, such as ALARP, cannot be implemented
within the financial climate of modern healthcare systems. How-
ever, it might be possible to start a dialogue and build a common
framework around how healthcare providers and the healthcare
system as a whole would like to treat patient safety risk in a con-
sistent way. A main prerequisite for starting such a process is a bet-
ter understanding of proactive, risk-based approaches among
stakeholders in healthcare. Further education is required to pro-
vide a more proactive mindset that shifts from the consideration
of outcomes only towards a risk-based perspective. There is an
opportunity to use safety cases to facilitate this process by devel-
oping explicit accounts of the risks that are present in the system
(Sujan et al., 2015). However, healthcare providers require assur-
ance from the regulators that such an exposition of risk – rather
than the demonstration of safety – would not have negative reper-
cussions (Health Foundation, 2014).
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dence of their direct contribution to safety performance in safety–
critical industries (Leveson, 2011; Steinzor, 2011). While it could
be argued that this may be impossible to produce given the com-
plexity and dynamism of the industries, this opens up the approach
to criticism andmaymake its adoption in healthcare more difficult.
In healthcare, there is arguably a strong preference for ‘‘evidence-
based” approaches. There is a risk that safety cases could be
regarded as an intervention with associated costs and unclear evi-
dence about their effectiveness. In addition to education about risk,
there is, therefore, a need to produce and communicate more com-
pelling empirical evidence about the contribution of safety cases to
proactive safety management practices and to safety performance.
6. Conclusions
The failings at Mid Staffordshire and the media coverage around
the extent of unnecessary patient harm and suffering shocked both
healthcare professionals as well as the public. There is agreement
that healthcare providers have to become more proactive, and that
they should seek to adopt more rigorous patient safety manage-
ment practices. Healthcare systems and policy makers are looking
at other industries for lessons about effective safety management.
Often the transfer of lessons from safety–critical industries to
healthcare is difficult due to the different organisational, cultural
and regulatory contexts.
Safety cases have the potential to support healthcare providers in
setting up more proactive and structured safety management sys-
tems. However, the level ofmaturity of safetymanagement practices
in healthcare is arguably lower than in other safety–critical indus-
tries, and healthcare systems do not usually operate with similar
shared frameworks for communicating and justifying safety based
on common notions of acceptable levels of risk and reasonable prac-
ticability. Adopting safety cases in healthcare within a goal-based
regulatory framework to demonstrate that systems are acceptably
safe, as is practice in UK safety–critical industries, might prove to
be an uphill struggle. It might not even be the most reasonable
approach, at least in the short-term. A more promising route might
be to identify possible ways in which safety cases might contribute
to a proactivemindset and discussion about risk in healthcare. Safety
cases might support healthcare organisations in developing an
understanding and an exposition of their current levels of risk, and
such an exposition of risk might be a useful communication tool
between healthcare providers and regulators. This requires a certain
level of trust between healthcare providers and regulators, and a
commitment to work together towards reducing the risk to patients.
Many of these concepts around risk and safety cases are still
alien to stakeholders in healthcare. Healthcare providers and regu-
lators require access to education and guidance that takes into
account the specifics of healthcare as an industry. In addition, fur-
ther research is required to provide evidence about the effective-
ness of safety cases and the costs involved with the approach.
Such evidence would enable stakeholders in healthcare to make
a more informed decision about regulatory approaches and organ-
isational safety management.
Based on the above discussion we identify the following
recommendations:
For healthcare regulatory bodies – Regulatory bodies should
work together in an effort to harmonise their regulatory
approaches and to transition towards a proactive, goal-based
regulatory framework.
For healthcare providers – Healthcare organisations should
develop proactively an explicit account of their patient safety
risks, and consider documenting these in a safety case.For healthcare systems – National healthcare systems should
develop healthcare-specific notions of acceptable levels of risk
in order to provide a consistent and transparent framework
for managing patient safety risk.
For safety science professionals and researchers – Safety profes-
sionals should develop healthcare-specific training and guid-
ance on proactive risk management and the role of safety
cases for healthcare providers and regulatory bodies. Safety
science researchers should design research studies that can pro-
vide empirical evidence of the contribution of safety cases to
proactive safety management practices and safety performance.
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